Furthermore, the dynamics of late modernization, especially urbanization, have threatened the traditional ethno-religious characteristics of Alevilik:
With the opening up of the closed parochial communities and the migration of their members to the big cities, the orally mediated and simple folk-beliefs of the Alevi are confronted by an outside world which cannot be integrated into their traditional religious parameters. The Alevi's narrow social basis of tribe and village communities, and their isolated conditions of life, resulted in a mystic world-view which failed to objectify itself in a widespread written tradition."
The decline of traditional religious services and archaic Alevi rituals and institutions is a point also made by Alevi academics.'2 And this has led to the attempts to restructure the Alevi religion and culture in the urban context, resulting in emphasis on the religious and cultural aspects of Alevilik.
However, this should not lead us to think that class issues in contemporary Alevi politics are no more valid. We can talk about Alevilik as a resource of urban survival in maintaining an 'extra-state welfare system' through informal networks and clientalism.'3 Thus contemporary repoliticization of Alevilik may also be read as a reconstructive, modern and urban response to deepening class inequalities. Against the claims that in the radically diversified world of conflicts, class identities are obsolete, Ay$e Ayata, for example, draws attention to a significant class dimension in the case of Alevis:
Since the 1980s, (Alevis) have been experiencing downward mobility politically and economically. The significance of the unionized working class has declined parallel to the decline in the wages, so they are economically worse off as a social group. Now a new dimension has been added to this downward mobility trend; since a large number were employed by Social Democratic municipalities, their jobs are often threatened or taken away by the new right-wing incumbents. '4 Thus the 'extra-state welfare system', in the case of Alevis, is facing a serious problem. Being an Alevi today rarely contributes to class mobility in the case of the service or industrial workers and the new migrants to big cities. It may even hinder it in certain cases, given the institutional and political (as well as social) Sunni bias against Alevis. This may increase the radical politicization tendencies in this group of economically disadvantaged Alevis. The Gazi event in Istanbul (1995) is a recent example of the class-based revolt of Alevis. '5 In brief, while structurally there certainly is a class dimension to contemporary Alevi re-politicization, actual Alevi politics manifests itself through a 'politics of recognition' where the demands of various Alevi groups are voiced in order to have equal participation in all spheres of life without facing discrimination, especially in their relations with the Sunni population. In this 'politics of recognition', different Alevi groups have emerged with different claims on Alevilik. In the following section, we elaborate on the contemporary Alevi politics in Turkish society through its rival groups, popular debates, inner dynamics and connections with the more general power struggle. Our focus here is on different Alevi movements in politics, and not on cultural and/or religious differences among the Alevis which range from Tahtacilar to Bektashis. While doing so, we first cover the Alevilik in the literature as a significant means of shaping the Alevi political orientations.
The late 1980s can be marked as the period when the first popular and academic works began to appear, and the first debates were heard (or read) in the media. After 1990, both in Europe and in Turkey, Alevi (Turkish and  Kurdish) The manifesto goes on to call for the acceptance of the difference of the Alevi faith and culture, equal representation and opportunities in education, in the media and in receiving their own religious services. It further emphasizes that Alevis have always supported and do still support the principles and reforms of Atatiirk, and Sunni people are called to learn more about Alevis and to get rid of their biases.
With this text the Alevi identity made its first influential public appearance. Although the manifesto implied that there was one single Alevilik and a unified Alevi people, which is highly disputable, the text was nonetheless important since it was received very positively by the intellectual community, and it later lured many non-religious or even Sunni sympathizers into contributing to the growing Alevi literature. Today there exists a small 'library' of Alevi literature, and as Olsson implies, this shows the eagerness of Alevi communities to know about their identities and to produce historical and political claims about them:
Among the rights claimed by minorities like the Alevi is the right to write down their own version of history ... By writing or telling one's own history an imagined community of an idealized past is constructed, and even conjured up, into which the needs and wishes of all present are projected. Like genealogies and origin myths, the telling of history provides meaning, experience of identity, and visibility. Hence, historiography creates mutually conflicting histories which are used and abused to justify politically controversial issues, such as claims on land and independence. '7 Popular works on Alevilik are many, and they mainly deal with a number of common themes: Alevi religious teachings, rituals, folklore, the nature of Alevi religious institutions such as cem or musahiplik, and the like. Almost all of such works give a brief history of Alevilik, and depending on the writer's political intentions, these histories vary: Sometimes the cult of Ali is highly praised, sometimes various social uprisings in Selcuk and Ottoman history are emphasized, or the writer may try to justify his or her case by focusing on a certain personality, like Pir Sultan Abdal or Haci Bekta, Veli. The target population is either the large number of ordinary Alevis who do not have access to knowledge about Alevi religious practices and who, in the official education system, cannot learn anything about Alevilik, or the mass of Sunni readers who do not know anything about Alevilik (or else do but have biased knowledge).
The authors of popular works are sometimes Alevi religious leaders (dedes or dede-babas, or descendants of them) with a significant amount of religious and historical knowledge on the specific Alevilik they have faith in. A very common practice is the supplementation of the texts by tasavvuf (sophism), Alevi, or Bektashi poetry, religious prayers, excerpts from the Koran or from Ali's or Muhammed's sayings. Although they are less in number, there are also popular works by Sunni religious people'8 and nationalists,'9 whose target population is the large Sunni and patriotic communities. These latter works and most of the likes of them are propagandist works which supply the reader with misleading information, tending to reproduce already-existing Sunni biases against the Alevi faith. On the other hand, some of the popular Alevi works may also be manipulating and usually assume an anti-Sunni rhetoric when they talk about the injustice done to Ali and his family after Muhammed's death, or when they tell about the Sheikh Bedreddin revolt.
Marxist-oriented populist works20 in this category share a common theme of equating the historical oppression of Alevi communities (and even pre-Alevi uprisings like Babai revolts of the Selcuk era) with class struggle (the Sheikh Bedreddin case, for example), and Alevilik with popular socialism. These works are fewer in number when compared to those which merely inform about the historico-religious aspects of Alevilik.
Rival 'popular' Alevi groups are more or less apparent in the literature: Kurdish Alevi populists, Social-Democratic Alevis, more religiously conservative Alevis, Alevis emphasizing patriotism, and the like. On the whole, we may say that while the Alevi identity (whatever form it takes according to the political standpoint of the writer) is strengthened through this popularization via books in circulation, the majority of the popular works do not establish any links between the traditional-religious dimension of Alevilik and the changing, transforming processes in contemporary society.
In contrast to popular works, journalistic works, aside from those numerous serial articles printed in dailies, are not many in number.2' Similar to popular works, these works also include summaries about common Alevi rituals and institutions, who is Ali, what do Alevi dedes do, and so on. Different from the first category, we encounter here as many non-Alevi intellectuals and journalists (usually Left-oriented, even non-practicing Sunnis) as Alevi ones. The political dimension, different from popular works, is more carefully introduced in these works. We are introduced to a more comprehensive analysis of the oppression of Alevi people in Ottoman and Republican times, learn how and why the socialist discourse is related with Alevilik; or we are told, in a less populistic manner, how Alevis embraced Kemalism in the 1920s and how they establish a 'popular front' against the radical Sunni 'threat' today.
In addition, sociological-anthropological studies22 and historical studies23 on Alevilik have been conducted by academics, and Alevis have mainly been studied, for example in relation to migration, gecekondu life, urbanization, ethnicity, and social conflict. There are fewer Alevi intellectuals in this category, and a very small number of such books are publicly read (most of the academic work is in foreign languages).
In brief, we can say that although 'written Alevilik' does not directly 'agitate' the Alevi believer, it provides easy access to a cultural and historical legacy of Alevilik: legends, tales, poetry, religious practices. All this accumulation of knowledge helps justify the existence of a particular Alevi identity. We now turn to Alevi political groups (and groups having claims on Alevilik) and to the significant public debates concerning Alevilik. The 'Ultra-Nationalist' approach can be considered more as a kind of reaction rather than as an alternative Alevilik. However, we should bear in mind that a certain ultra-nationalist branch, naming itself the Nationalist Alevi Youth as a branch of MHP's (the Nationalist Action Party) youth organizations, feeds upon anti-Kurdish propaganda in society. Some of the versions of this reaction bear highly Sunni overtones, claiming that the Alevi-Sunni division is artificially created by traitors, terrorists and Communists in order to push the nation towards anarchy and disintegration. There should be no religious disputes, they say, since we are all Turks and Muslims under one Flag. Nevertheless, according to this group, contemporary Alevilik is a non-Islamic diversion that should be reintegrated into Sunnism.
A number of academics
Some nationalist interpreters of Alevilik strongly stress the Shamanist/ ancient Turkic legacy within Alevi syncretism and claim that Alevilik was a 'Turkmen Sunnism' formed during the era in which Turks were newly accepting -or being forced to accept -Islam. Gradually, according to these nationalist interpreters of Alevilik, it was corrupted into a heresy (even kiifr) whose believers do not practice Sunni rituals, think Ali is God, share their wives, easily become Communists, and the like. In brief, given the contemporary high credit accorded Turkish nationalism and patriotism, the nationalist call for prioritizing 'our Turkish identity' (putting it even before death) above all other forms of communitybelonging finds an affirmative echo in society, as well as in many political groups. On the other hand, given the historical enmity of ultra-nationalists against Alevis as witnessed in the Maras (1979) and corum (1980) events, and also in the more recent Sivas32 (1993) and Gazi-Istanbul33 (1995) incidents these reactions or attempts to disintegrate Alevi differences do not stand much chance in Alevi political groups. Sunni Islamists, be they politicians or academics (or both), do not stand much chance within Alevi politics of gaining support for their views. Nevertheless, they are potentially more significant than the previous four groups, that is, they are more likely to produce stronger effects within Alevi religious debates. Today, Sunni Islamists are generally assimilative in their approach to Alevis, and they mainly follow three strategies: they define it as a 'subculture' and hence do not recognize its theological significance; they regard it as a mere religious sect and hence suppress it by claiming that the Directorate of Religious Affairs is above all sects; and finally they claim that there are 'good' and 'bad' Alevis, and in the latter group are included Although it is yet to be seen what kind of 'Leftism' will DSP perform, the current scene seems to justify our claim in the near future: Alevi politics will continue to be affirmative in reducing, but not totally effacing, the ethnic and religious differences included in its space to 'harmonious parts of a fixed whole'. Thus, the Republican Alevis and their foundation the Cem Vakfi, we think, are likely to gain control over the proper definitions of the 'Alevi', the contents and histories of Alevilik, and what the legitimate religious practices are. On the other hand, the PISA group is far less likely to gain the upper hand, with its less religious, more Socialist rhetoric, a rhetoric which feeds on a Marxist core. It is questionable whether the group will manage to mobilize subaltern Alevis without getting rid of its anti-systemic overtones. Given that in today's political context the winds of nationalism are blowing harder than ever, any political movement with explicit anti-systemic dispositions, especially Socialist discourses (even though they have nothing to do with terrorism), will tend to receive a chauvinistic rejection from the ordinary citizen.
When it comes to the question of whether the recognition of Alevi difference(s) will aid the creation of a more pluralistic political system, we have some reservations. Today the formation of a class structure within the Alevi population makes it problematic to claim that there is the Alevi community whose major problem is its oppression as a people because of their sectarian beliefs. Thus, an identity politics which limits itself to the cultural and religious aspects of Alevilik(s), as is the case of the Republican Alevis, is bound to fail to address the contemporary economic problems of the Alevi (ranging from access to urban services and housing to access to employment opportunities). The Republican Alevis fail to address the erosion of Alevi influence in local politics, and as a result, the problem of downward mobility and economic deterioration which Alevis, and particularly those living in gecekondu settlements, are experiencing. Without rejecting the fact that the recognition of the Alevi identity in politics is a political gain in itself, we are still skeptical about the possible contributions of Alevi politics to Turkish democracy, as shaped under current political conditions. Without acknowledging the class dimension, as well as the ethnic issue, Alevi politics cannot be fully democratic. 
